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Abstract
Background:  Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibles are the beneficiaries of both Medicare and
Medicaid. Dual eligibles satisfy the eligibility conditions for Medicare benefit. Dual eligibles also
qualify for Medicaid because they are aged, blind, or disabled and meet the income and asset
requirements for receiving Supplement Security Income (SSI) assistance. The objective of this study
is to explore the relationship between dual eligibility and health care utilization among Medicare
beneficiaries.
Methods: The household component of the nationally representative Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) 1996–2000 is used for the analysis. Total 8,262 Medicare beneficiaries are selected
from the MEPS data. The Medicare beneficiary sample includes individuals who are covered by
Medicare and do not have private health insurance during a given year. Zero-inflated negative
binomial (ZINB) regression model is used to analyse the count data regarding health care
utilization: office-based physician visits, hospital inpatient nights, agency-sponsored home health
provider days, and total dental visits.
Results: Dual eligibility is positively correlated with the likelihood of using hospital inpatient care
and agency-sponsored home health services and the frequency of agency-sponsored home health
days. Frequency of dental visits is inversely associated with dual eligibility. With respect to racial
differences, dually eligible Afro-Americans use more office-based physician and dental services than
white duals. Asian duals use more home health services than white duals at the 5% statistical
significance level. The dual eligibility programs seem particularly beneficial to Afro-American duals.
Conclusion: Dual eligibility has varied impact on health care utilization across service types. More
utilization of home healthcare among dual eligibles appears to be the result of delayed realization
of their unmet healthcare needs under the traditional Medicare-only program rather than the result
of overutilization in response to the expanded benefits of the dual eligibility program. The dual
eligibility program is particularly beneficial to Asian and Afro-American duals in association with the
provision of home healthcare and dental benefits.
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Background
It has been an important financial issue in the Medicare
system that health care expenses of dually eligible benefi-
ciaries (DEB) are much higher than those of Medicare-
only beneficiaries (MOB). Total health expenditures for
the dually eligible beneficiaries are more than double
those of the Medicare-only beneficiaries. In 1999, total
annual health expenditures (including Medicare, Medic-
aid, private, and out-of-pocket spending) averaged
$16,278 for each dually eligible beneficiary, compared
with $7,396 on average for those who are not dually eligi-
ble [1].
Dually eligible beneficiaries, who are covered by both
Medicare and Medicaid, represent only one-fifth of each
program's enrollment, about 7 million in 1997, but
account for a much larger share of each program's spend-
ing (Komisar et al., 2000) [2]. In 1999, these dually eligi-
ble beneficiaries accounted for about $50 billion in
Medicare expenditures (24 percent of total Medicare
spending) and $63 billion in Medicaid expenditures (35
percent of total Medicaid spending) nationwide, reflect-
ing their relatively greater medical and long-term care
demands [1]. The dually eligible beneficiaries are the most
costly population being served by publicly funded health
care programs [3].
The dually eligible population are more likely to be disa-
bled and either younger (under age 65) or older (over age
85) than the majority of Medicare beneficiaries [3]. Over
half of the dually eligible beneficiaries are in fair or poor
health, whereas only one quarter of the entire Medicare
beneficiaries are reported to be in fair or poor health. In
particular, the dually eligible beneficiaries are more likely
to suffer from chronic and serious health conditions such
as diabetes, pulmonary disease, and stroke. More than 40
percent of dually eligible beneficiaries have a cognitive or
mental impairment, while only 9 percent of the entire
Medicare population have similar mental problems [1,4].
Dually eligible beneficiaries are culturally diverse. Over 42
percent of the dual eligibles represent racial minority pop-
ulation, whereas 16 percent of the entire Medicare benefi-
ciaries belong to the racial minority groups [3].
Known for the high costs and complex healthcare needs,
dually eligible beneficiaries have been the center of debate
in both programs as neither Medicare nor Medicaid take
full responsibility to face the medical needs of the dual eli-
gibles. Dually eligible beneficiaries are still viewed as a
heavy liability to public and private insurers in the United
States [3]. In spite of its importance in establishing an effi-
cient and reliable public healthcare system, studies on the
dual eligibility program are limited.
The purpose of this study is to examine the health care uti-
lization by dually eligible beneficiaries compared with
Medicare-only beneficiaries. Medicare-Medicaid dual eli-
gibles have more benefits by virtue of also being enrolled
in both programs. We will explore the effect of the addi-
tional Medicaid coverage on their healthcare utilization
with special emphasis on racial differences. We catego-
rized the sample population into four racial groups:
Whites, Asians, Hispanics, and Afro-Americans. Hispanics
indicate those who self-identified themselves from His-
panic origin including both whites and non-whites.
We limit our sample to individuals who have Medicare
coverage continuously throughout a given year but have
never any private health insurance. By controlling for
demographic, socioeconomic, and health-related poten-
tial confounding factors, we estimate the magnitude of
the statistical association between dual eligibility and the
frequency/likelihood of using healthcare services. We
employ a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regres-
sion model to incorporate statistical features of the count
data as demonstrated in the Methods section.
Methods
Data
We used data from the 1996–2000 waves of the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS is a nation-
ally representative survey conducted by the U.S. Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). This ongo-
ing survey collects detailed information on health status,
healthcare use, medical expenditures, and insurance cov-
erage as well as various socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics for the U.S. civilian and non-institutional-
ized population.
Medicare beneficiaries are the population under study.
During 1996–2000, the MEPS interviewed 130,938 indi-
viduals; among them, 8,262 individuals are selected on
the basis of self-reporting that they have continuous Medi-
care coverage for the entire calendar year. Individuals with
private health insurance at any time as supplemental to
Medicare were excluded to avoid contamination from the
effect of Medicare-private dual eligibility. Approximately,
22.8% of the sample population, i.e., 1,181 individuals
out of the 8,262 Medicare sample beneficiaries, were iden-
tified as Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibles.
Dependent variables
Utilization variables are measured as the total number of
office-based physician visits, hospital inpatient nights,
agency-sponsored home health days, and dental visits per
year.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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Office-based physician visits consist of encounters with
physician services that took place primarily in office-
based and clinic settings. Health services provided in
other settings such as a hospital, nursing home, or a per-
son's home do not belong to this category. Also, non-phy-
sician visits to chiropractors, midwives, nurses and nurse
practitioners, optometrists, podiatrists, physician's assist-
ants, physical therapists, occupational therapists, psychol-
ogists, social workers, technicians, receptionists/clerks/
secretaries, or other medical providers are not included in
this category. The analysis focuses on the number of visits
to physicians because the majority of office-based visits
are concentrated on physician providers.
Hospital inpatient nights are measured by the number of
nights spent in hospitals for receiving inpatient care. This
variable is chosen for examining the utilization of hospi-
tal inpatient services by patients.
Agency-sponsored home health provider days indicate the
number of days in which home healthcare services are
provided by paid caregivers such as hospitals or nursing
homes. Information on the utilization of home healthcare
is collected by the MEPS on a monthly basis. By adding up
the number of provider days per month for all home
health providers seen, the number of home health pro-
vider days per year is obtained. For example, if a person
received care in one month from one provider on two dif-
ferent days, the number of provider days would equal
two. If a person received care from two different providers
on the same day, the number of provider days would also
equal two. However, if a person received care from one
provider two times in the same day, then the provider
days would equal one.
Total dental visits represent the total number of dental vis-
its per year to any dental care provider(s) including gen-
eral dentists, dental hygienists, dental technicians, dental
surgeons, orthodontists, endodontists, and periodontists.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Medicare-only beneficiaries (MOB) and dually eligible beneficiaries (DEB)
Variable Total MOB DEB
Total Asian Black Hispanic
N 8,262 (100%) 6,381 (77.2%) 1,881 (22.8%) 92 (1.11%) 475 (5.75%) 513 (6.21%)
Demographic variables
Age (mean) 69.3 (15.4) 70.9*** (13.4) 64.1*** (19.8) 71.1 (16.0) 63.5 (20.7) 67.1 (18.1)
Elderly (age 65 and over) 0.80 (0.40) 0.84*** (0.37) 0.67*** (0.47) 0.88 (0.33) 0.65 (0.48) 0.77 (0.42)
Male 0.41 (0.49) 0.43*** (0.50) 0.32*** (0.47) 0.38 (0.49) 0.31 (0.48) 0.33 (0.42)
Married 0.41 (0.49) 0.47*** (0.50) 0.23*** (0.42) 0.44 (0.50) 0.15 (0.36) 0.31 (0.46)
Rural 0.27 (0.45) 0.26*** (0.44) 0.30*** (0.46) 0.04 (0.21) 0.28 (0.45) 0.38 (0.39)
College and more 0.12 (0.31) 0.13*** (0.33) 0.04*** (0.20) 0.12 (0.33) 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.13)
High school graduation 0.40 (0.48) 0.40*** (0.49) 0.24*** (0.42) 0.12 (0.33) 0.25 (0.42) 0.12 (0.32)
Less than high school 0.48 (0.50) 0.47*** (0.50) 0.73*** (0.44) 0.76 (0.43) 0.74 (0.44) 0.86 (0.34)
Asian 0.02 (0.15) 0.02*** (0.13) 0.05*** (0.22) -- -- --
Hispanic 0.17 (0.37) 0.13*** (0.34) 0.27*** (0.45) -- -- --
Afro-American 0.18 (0.39) 0.16*** (0.37) 0.25*** (0.43) -- -- --
Socioeconomic variables
Poverty 0.25 (0.43) 0.19*** (0.39) 0.45*** (0.50) 0.33 (0.47) 0.53 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49)
Still work 0.11 (0.31) 0.13*** (0.34) 0.04*** (0.20) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17)
Health-related variables
Poor health 0.36 (0.48) 0.32*** (0.47) 0.50*** (0.50) 0.36 (0.48) 0.50 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
Medical condition(s) of priority list 0.48 (0.50) 0.48*** (0.50) 0.51*** (0.50) 0.36 (0.50) 0.58 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Number of co-morbidities 5.67 (4.19) 5.44*** (4.01) 6.47*** (4.68) 4.15 (3.16) 5.80 (4.45) 6.40 (4.62)
Limitation(s) to ADL 0.11 (0.43) 0.09*** (0.42) 0.20*** (0.46) 0.14 (0.43) 0.22 (0.47) 0.22 (0.47)
Limitation(s) to IADL 0.19 (0.46) 0.15*** (0.45) 0.33*** (0.49) 0.24 (0.48) 0.36 (0.50) 0.30 (0.49)
Dependent variables
Office-based physician visits 6.42 (8.26) 6.09*** (7.44) 7.54*** (10.52) 5.98 (17.94) 6.81 (11.43) 7.73 (10.05)
Hospital inpatient nights 1.95 (7.49) 1.73*** (7.02) 2.66*** (8.86) 0.24 (1.04) 2.73 (8.31) 2.80 (9.13)
Home health provider days 11.87 (51.4) 5.82*** (34.0) 32.5*** (84.7) 5.04 (27.3) 40.8 (90.3) 36.35 (96.9)
Total dental visits 0.78 (1.98) 0.87*** (2.10) 0.48*** (1.50) 0.39 (1.00) 0.45 (1.32) 0.51 (1.54)
Notes: Two-tailed t-tests are performed to see the statistical significance of differences in demographic, socioeconomic, health-related, and 
dependent variables between MOBs and DEBs. Mean values are reported with standard deviations in brackets. Mean values for the outcome 
variables reflect the mean values among all the eligible beneficiaries. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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Explanatory variables
Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics of the sample
for the analysis. The average age of the sample is 69.3.
Among the sample members, 41% are male; 41% are mar-
ried; 27% live in rural areas; 48% have education of less
than high school graduation.
Hispanics and Afro-Americans represent 17% and 18% of
the sample, respectively. Approximately 22.8% of the
sample members are Medicare-Medicaid dually eligible
beneficiaries. One out of four individuals is in poverty
and almost one out of ten members works as a part-time/
temporary worker.
According to the self-reported health indicator, 36% of
individuals report that they are in fair or poor health out
of five-scale measurement. Approximately, 48% of the
respondents have chronic medical conditions such as dia-
betes, cancer, hypertension, heart failure, arthritis, depres-
sion, and other mental disorders. Respondents on average
have 5.67 co-morbid symptoms.
Statistical analysis
Measures for healthcare use (denoted by y) have three fun-
damental statistical properties: (1) to be non-negative (y ≥
0); (2) to have a non-trivial fraction of zero outcomes; and
(3) to follow a positively skewed distribution of the non-
zero realizations. These unique count data structures
enforce our empirical investigation to rely on the count
model as illustrated below:
Model 1
Generalized linear model (GLM) relates an outcome (y) to
exogenous covariates x as follows:
g(E(y)) = xβ, y ~ F   (1)
where g(.) is called the link function and F refers to the
distributional families. Substituting various specifications
for  g(.)  and  F  result in an array of the models. For
instance, if we assume F to be a Poisson or negative bino-
mial (NB) distribution, it gives us a log-linear model of
the count data:
log(E(y)) = xβ, y~Poisson/Negative Binomial (NB)   (2)
Poisson regression assumes that the dependent variable y,
the number of occurrence of an event, has a Poisson dis-
tribution given an independent variable vector x,
P(y = k| x) = e-µ µk / k!,   k = 0, 1, 2, ......,   (3)
It is easily shown that the mean and variance of this distri-
bution equal to µ, or E(y) = var(y) = µ. Then, equation (2)
can be written as a log-linear function of the independent
variables x given as
log(µ) = xβ or equivalently, µ = exp(xβ).   (4)
The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the
parameters of a Poisson regression model. From equation
(4), the log-likelihood function is given as
where µ follows equation (4) for all i.
Both Poisson and negative binomial regressions are stand-
ard count models used to deal with the number of occur-
rence of an event. The restrictive condition of the equality
of mean and variance in the Poisson distribution (equidis-
persion) is the reason that the negative binomial model is
often preferred. The negative binomial regression assumes
that the dependent count variable y follows a negative
binomial distribution instead of a Poisson given an inde-
pendent variable vector x,
where α is a dispersion parameter, measuring the extent of
overdispersion. From equation (6), the log-likelihood
function for the negative binomial maximum likelihood
estimation is obtained as
Since the standard Poisson model does not allow the pres-
ence of overdispersion, we employ likelihood ratio (LR)
test of the overdispersion parameter α  to examine the
validity of the Poisson specification against the negative
binomial model.
Model 2
The zero-inflated (ZI) count model is a mixing specifica-
tion that adds extra weight to the probability of observing
a zero [5,6]. This can be interpreted as a splitting mecha-
nism that divides individuals into non-users, with proba-
bility ω, and potential users, with probability 1 - ω. We
assume that there is a parent distribution function,
denoted by φ, for outcome realizations. In one regime
[Part 1], outcomes are always zero. In the second regime
[Part 2], outcomes are non-zeros. For each regime, the
probability density function is a weighted average of the
parent density given as
φ1 = ω + (1 - ω)φ, [Part 1]   (8)
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and
φ2 = (1 - ω)φ, [Part 2]   (9)
where ω is a weight parameter to let the integral of equa-
tions (8) and (9) be equal to one. The log-likelihood func-
tion Λ is specified from φ1 and φ2 as follows:
The principal motivation for the zero-inflated count
model is that observed data frequently display a higher
relative frequency of zeros (excess zeros) than standard
count models, which is the feature of zero-inflated count
model [5,6]. This refers to observing more zeros than is
consistent with the standard Poisson or another baseline
count model specifications1[7]. Vuong test statistics are
needed to provide the appropriateness of ZI models
against the standard count models2 [8].
Specification tests
In our study, the utilization of healthcare is measured as
the number of physician visits, hospital inpatient nights,
home health provider days, and total dental visits. More
than 70% of Medicare beneficiaries reported zero utiliza-
tion for all types of healthcare services except for physician
visits (Table 2). For verifying the hypothesis that a modi-
fied count model with overdispersion is the adequate spec-
ification for the analysis, we implement three
specification tests to alternative models; (a) a normality
test against Model 1, (b) a likelihood-ratio (LR) test for the
overdispersion parameter α in the negative binomial (NB)
specification against the Poisson model specification3
[7,9,10], and (c) Vuong test of the standard count model
against the zero-inflated count model. The test results
reject the assumption of the normal distribution; reject
the Poisson specification; and reject the standard count
model. We conclude that the zero-inflated negative bino-
mial (ZINB) model, in which the parent distribution is
specified to follow a negative binomial distribution as in
equation (6), is the best fit for our data. The test statistics
are available upon request to the authors.
The ZINB regression expresses the count outcome y as a
function of various explanatory variables x, including
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, health
conditions and insurance coverage status as the following:
φ(yi,θ| X) = φ(yi, B, γ|Zi, Dual_Eligiblei)   (11)
where φ is a negative binomial probability density func-
tion.  i  denotes the index for an individual. yi is total
number of healthcare use (that is, office-based physician
visits, hospital inpatient nights, home health provider
days, and dental visits) in a given year for an individual i.
The dependent count variable yi follows a negative bino-
mial distribution given an independent variable vector Xi,
where θ represents a coefficient vector incorporated with
the negative binomial probability density function. Zi rep-
resents a set of explanatory variables such as age, gender,
marital status, education, race/ethnicity, employment sta-
tus, family income, region of residence, self-reported
health status, number of co-morbidities, limitations to
activities, diagnosed chronic diseases and dummies for a
survey year. Our major control variable is a binary indica-
tor of Dual_Eligiblei, which is equal to 1 if an individual i
is dually eligible and 0 otherwise. B and γ indicate the cor-
responding coefficients for Zi and Dual_Eligiblei, respec-
tively.
Results
Who are dually eligible population?
Table 1 shows differences in demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics between Medicare-only beneficiar-
ies (MOB) and dually eligible beneficiaries (DEB). Mean
age is 70.9 for Medicare-only beneficiaries while 64.1 for
dually eligible beneficiaries. Compared with Medicare-
only beneficiaries, the dually eligible beneficiaries are
more likely to be female (68% versus 57%), unmarried
(77% versus 53%), and less educated (4% versus 13%
with college education and more). As to socioeconomic
status, probability of being in poverty is much higher
among dually eligible beneficiaries (45%) than among
Medicare-only beneficiaries (19%).
Regarding health status, the dually eligible beneficiaries
are more likely to have adverse medical conditions listed
as predetermined priority conditions (priority list) such as
hypertension, diabetes mellitus, cardiac problems, and
arthritis. On average, 51% of the dually eligible benefici-
aries suffer from any priority conditions compared with
48% of Medicare-only beneficiaries to have chronic dis-
ease(s). Mean number of co-morbidities among dually
eligible beneficiaries is slightly larger (6.47) than that of
Λ= + − + − () ∑∑ log{ ( ) } log{( ) }.
zeros nonzeros
ωω φ ω φ 111 0
Table 2: Percentage of non-zero users and mean values for health 
services use among Medicare beneficiaries and non-zero users
Health Services Medicare 
Beneficiaries
Non-Zero Users
Office-based physician visits 6.418 (100%) 7.474 (85.88%)
Hospital inpatient nights 1.945 (100%) 10.697 (18.18%)
Home health provider days 11.871 (100%) 103.058 (11.41%)
Total dental visits 0.783 (100%) 2.699 (29.00%)
Notes: Medicare beneficiaries represent all individuals that are covered 
by Medicare benefits. This group includes both users and non-users of 
healthcare services. Non-zero users indicate the respondents who had 
positive visits, nights, or days for each type of outcome variables. 
Mean values are measured for each type of outcome variables among 
Medicare beneficiaries and non-zero users, respectively. Numbers in the 
brackets indicate the percentage of each group out the whole sample.4BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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Medicare-only beneficiaries (5.44). Whereas about 20%
of dual eligibles have limitation(s) to activities of daily liv-
ing (ADL), only about 9% of Medicare-only beneficiaries
have difficulties in ADL. Approximately 33% of dually eli-
gible beneficiaries have at least one limitation to instru-
mental activities of daily living (IADL), compared with
15% of Medicare-only beneficiaries. These findings indi-
cate that dually eligible beneficiaries are more vulnerable
to chronic health conditions and frailty. Consequently
they have more health care needs than Medicare-only
beneficiaries.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the relationship
between dual eligibility and healthcare utilization: office-
based physician visits, hospital inpatient nights, agency-
sponsored home health provider days, and total dental
visits. The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics of the overd-
ispersion parameter α indicate that the Poisson model is
rejected (and the negative binomial (NB) model is
employed) at the 5% level of statistical significance for all
outcome variables. Vuong (1989) test results reveal that
for all outcome measures the ZINB model is preferred
against the standard NB model. As the result of the series
of specification tests, the ZINB model is chosen as the best
fit to the count data in use.
The covariate effect of the extra-zero component in the
model is estimated by a logit regression. The probability
of being a non-user of healthcare and estimated coeffi-
cients as a logit function of observed covariates are
reported in Table 3. In the logit inflation model, the
dependent variable is an indicator 1(yi = 0), which takes 1
if yi = 0, and zero otherwise.
Based on the logit results, the dually eligible beneficiaries
(DEBs) are more likely to use hospital inpatient care (odd
ratio = 1.33 (= exp(0.285)) and home health care (odd
ratio = 2.99 (= exp(1.066)) at the 5% level of significance.
However, dually eligible beneficiaries (DEBs) are not sta-
tistically different from Medicare-only beneficiaries
(MOBs) in the likelihood of using office-based physician
and dental services at the 5% level of significance.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 indicate that, among the
potential users of Medicare beneficiaries including whites,
dual eligibility does not have any statistically significant
correlation with either office-based physician visits or
hospital inpatient nights at the 5% statistical significance
level. However, physician visits by Afro-Americans
increased owing to dual eligibility in office-based physi-
cian services at the 5% level.
Dual eligibility is statistically significant to increase the
likelihood of using hospital inpatient care at the 5% level
(odd ratio = 1.33 (= exp(0.285)). But it is not statistically
associated with the number of hospital inpatient nights
among hospital care users at the 5% level. Since the logit
result is derived from the entire sample of both non-users
and users, the overall relationship between dual eligibility
and hospital care utilization may be regarded as positive.
Column (3) shows that dual eligibility is positively corre-
lated with the likelihood of using agency-sponsored home
health days (odd ratio = 2.99 (= exp(1.066)) as well as the
frequency of service receipt days among the users (IRR =
1.958) at the 5% level of statistical significance.
With respect to racial differences in the utilization of
home healthcare, the magnitude of the correlation
between the frequency of home healthcare use by Asians
and dual eligibility is particularly impressive. In general,
Asians utilize home health services less often than whites
(IRR = 0.044) whereas Hispanics and Afro-Americans
make more frequent visits to home healthcare providers
(IRR = 1.790 for Hispanics and IRR = 2.216 for Afro-Amer-
icans) than whites. Among Asian duals, however, the level
of home healthcare use substantially rises compared to
other races with dual eligibility at the 5% level of statisti-
cal significance (IRR = 33.05(= 1.958*16.879)).
The statistically significant, large effect of dual eligibility
on the frequency of home healthcare receipt days is
related to the level and scope differences in home health
benefits between Medicare-only and Medicare-Medicaid
dual eligibility programs. The home healthcare benefits
covered by Medicaid is much more comprehensive than
that of Medicare by including many other benefits that
might be collectively called long-term care. These benefits
include chore aides in case-specific situations and per-
sonal care services/attendants, which many states choose
to include in their Medicaid programs. All such services
except for home care are optional in Medicare, whose cov-
erage and payments for home health services vary from
state to state.
As to the scope of home healthcare services provided,
Medicaid payments are not restricted to skilled services as
are Medicare payments. Also, unlike Medicare, Medicaid
home health does not require that an individual be home
bound. Medicaid pays for almost all sorts of home health-
care, reducing individual financial burdens effectively.
Medicare, however, with its limited payment, often fails to
meet its beneficiaries' home healthcare needs. As a result,
Medicare-only beneficiaries are forced to pay for needed
services out-of-pocket resources or to skip the receipt of
services. Our empirical results indicate that expanded
home health benefits from Medicaid help Asian duals
receive home healthcare, which sometimes are not prop-
erly provided by the Medicare-only program.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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Table 3: Statistical association of dual eligibility and health care utilization
Office-based physician visits (1) Hospital inpatient nights (2) Home health provider days (3) Total dental visits (4)
Demographics
Age 0.997 (0.001)*** 0.997 (0.003) 1.003 (0.003) 0.991 (0.002)***
Male 0.993 (0.022) 1.380 (0.110)*** 1.097 (0.105) 0.867 (0.044)***
Married 1.063 (0.023)** 0.768 (0.062)*** 0.616 (0.066)*** 1.178 (0.060)***
Less than High School 0.891 (0.020)*** 0.979 (0.076) 0.969 (0.094) 0.778 (0.054)***
Rural 0.970 (0.023) 0.984 (0.077) 1.439 (0.133)*** 0.759 (0.043)***
Region
Northeast 1.083 (0.031)*** 0.961 (0.100) 1.242 (0.150)* 1.357 (0.088)***
Midwest 0.962 (0.027) 0.974 (0.091) 0.807 (0.094)* 1.149 (0.074)**
West 0.901 (0.025)*** 0.715 (0.070)*** 0.799 (0.100)* 1.162 (0.075)**
Medical condition
Poor Health 1.168 (0.026)*** 1.292 (0.093)*** 1.424 (0.125)*** 0.757 (0.042)***
Co-morbidities 1.140 (0.003)*** 1.060 (0.009)*** 1.037 (0.010)*** 1.081 (0.007)***
Chronic Disease 1.147 (0.023)*** 1.120 (0.079) 0.850 (0.070)** 0.909 (0.043)**
Socioeconomic status
Poverty 1.004 (0.025) 0.897 (0.074) 1.020 (0.092) 0.894 (0.075)
Still Work 0.908 (0.032)*** 0.562 (0.079)*** 1.602 (0.403)* 0.833 (0.062)**
Race & dual eligibility
Asian 0.886 (0.087) 0.899 (0.458) 0.044 (0.034)*** 0.510 (0.117)***
Hispanic 0.997 (0.036) 1.009 (0.132) 1.790 (0.313)*** 1.082 (0.107)
Afro-American 0.959 (0.033) 1.063 (0.130) 2.216 (0.346)*** 0.622 (0.072)***
Dual Eligibility 1.016 (0.037) 1.003 (0.112) 1.958 (0.234)*** 0.708 (0.085)***
Dual*Asian 1.235 (0.184) 0.334 (0.238) 16.879 (15.54)*** 1.621 (0.564)*
Dual*Hispanic 1.106 (0.067)* 1.193 (0.237) 0.943 (0.216) 1.253 (0.211)
Dual*Afro-American 1.170 (0.072)*** 1.132 (0.226) 0.643 (0.132)** 1.926 (0.329)***
Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood -22573.77 -8603.889 -7757.978 -8696.873
Constant -4.012 (0.912)*** 1.480 (0.138)*** 3.071 (0.201)*** -3.211 (0.840)***
Cancer -22.16 (16771.5) -0.500 (0.088)*** -0.418 (0.088)*** -0.235 (0.134)*
Diabetes -20.73 (7065.7) -0.518 (0.075)*** -0.456 (0.078)*** 0.485 (0.102)***
Hypertension -11.54 (54.42) -0.158 (0.063)*** -0.029 (0.072) 0.043 (0.092)
Stroke -1.228 (0.942) -1.226 (0.129)*** -1.037 (0.115)*** 0.404 (0.165)**
Depression -1.314 (0.590)** -0.269 (0.072)*** -0.352 (0.074)*** -0.136 (0.100)
Less than High School 0.769 (0.235)*** -0.094 (0.072) -0.133 (0.081)* 1.084 (0.138)***
Poverty -0.260 (0.266) -0.314 (0.096)*** -0.167 (0.101)* 0.037 (0.146)
Still Work 0.404 (0.321) 0.084 (0.126) 0.943 (0.191)*** -0.742 (0.314)**
Asian 0.144 (0.945) 1.007 (0.340)*** 1.130 (0.364)*** -0.391 (0.503)
Hispanic 0.130 (0.318) 0.152 (0.096) 0.274 (0.106)*** 0.160 (0.148)
Afro-American 0.917 (0.255)*** 0.321 (0.093)*** -0.026 (0.096) 0.030 (0.207)
Dual eligibility -1.487 (0.761)* -0.285 (0.082)*** -1.066 (0.082)*** 0.241 (0.145)*
Income0 1.298 (0.987) 0.300 (0.189) 0.325 (0.272) 2.725 (0.813)***
Income1 1.614 (0.924)* 0.159 (0.146) -0.511 (0.214)** 2.420 (0.795)***
Income2 1.194 (0.910) -0.035 (0.136) -0.620 (0.206)*** 2.280 (0.790)***
Incoem3 0.861 (0.949) 0.211 (0.150) -0.300 (0.225) 1.724 (0.780)**
LR Chi2 (20) 2,766.11 136.25 199.10 333.40
Prob> Chi2 (20) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of obs. 8,260 8,255 8,185 8,260
Nonzero obs. 7,094 1,501 942 2,395
Zero obs. 1,166 6,754 7,243 5,865
alpha 0.572 (0.014) 1.906 (0.170) 1.522 (0.090) 1.377 (0.119)
Likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test of alpha = 0:
Chibar2(01) = 1.7e+04 
Prob>=Chibar2 = 0.000
Chibar2(01) = 1.3e+04; 
Prob>=Chibar2 = 0.000






Vuong test of ZINB vs. 
standard NB:
Z = 5.40; Prob>z = 0.000 Z = 7.76; Prob>z = 0.000 Z = 7.95; Prob>z = 0.000 Z = 8.21; Prob>z = 
0.000BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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Column (4) in Table 3 indicates that low education is
inversely correlated with both the likelihood of using den-
tal services and the frequency of dental visits at the 5%
level. The incidence rate ratio (IRR) of dental visits by dual
eligibles indicates that dual eligibles, whose average level
of education is lower than that of Medicare-only benefici-
aries (as shown in Table 1), are less likely to utilize dental
services compared to their non-dual counterparts.
With respect to racial differences, Afro-American dual eli-
gibles are positively associated with the frequency of den-
tal visits at the 5% level (IRR = 1.36 (i.e., 0.708*1.926)).
Afro-Americans are correlated with lower frequency of
dental visits than whites (IRR = 0.622) significantly at the
5% level, which is quite contrast to the increased fre-
quency of dental visits by Afro-American dual eligibles
(IRR = 1.36 (i.e., 0.708*1.926)).
Without dental benefits under the Medicare-only pro-
gram, Medicare-only beneficiaries are forced to pay for the
utilization of dental services from out-of-pocket
resources. The increased dental visits by Afro-American
duals seem to be delayed realization of their unmet needs
for dental care.
Discussion
Compared to Medicare-only beneficiaries, approximately
6.3 million dual eligibles in the U.S. are especially vulner-
able and have high medical care costs [11]. They are
repeatedly reported as poor and underserved population
[12].
The dual eligibility program is designed to help low-
income Medicare beneficiaries receive needed health care.
As Medicare program's cost-sharing requirements – pre-
miums, deductibles, and coinsurance – are often a finan-
cial burden to low-income beneficiaries and serve as a
barrier to receiving needed care, federal and local govern-
ments have expanded over time Medicaid to certain eligi-
bility groups whereby State Medicaid agencies are
required to pay all or some of the Medicare out-of-pocket
cost-sharing expenses for low-income Medicare benefici-
aries that meet income and asset criteria [12]. Collectively,
these individuals are referred to as dual eligibles or duals.
Dual eligibles qualify for Medicare because they are aged
65 or over, disabled and receive Social Security Disabled
Income (SSDI) assistance younger than age 65. Dual eligi-
bles qualify for Medicaid because they are aged, blind, or
disabled and meet the income and asset requirements for
Supplement Security Income (SSI) assistance. Addition-
ally, medically needy individuals qualify for Medicaid
because they spend down a large portion of annual
income and assets to pay for their medical or long-term
care costs [13]. Most of dual eligibles such as qualified
Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) and specified low-income
Medicare beneficiaries (SLMB) are entitled to receive full
Medicaid benefits. Others like qualifying individuals
(OIs), however, are not entitled to full Medicaid benefits
but subsidized for Medicare premiums and cost sharing
[11].
In this paper, we use the nationally representative data
from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to
explore the relationship between dual eligibility for Medi-
care and Medicaid, and health care utilization. Under-
standing dual eligibles – population, their health care
needs and health care usage – is the goal of this study for
contributing to development of a relevant health policy. It
seems useful to look at racial sub-groups of dual eligibles
because racial differences may provide a clue to under-
standing heterogeneous effects of dual eligibility on
health care use (and potentially unmet needs) of the poor
and underserved population.
Dually eligible beneficiaries are better off than low-
income Medicare-only enrollees who do not have dual
coverage because duals are entitled to additional health
benefits from Medicaid. We find that dual eligibility is
positively correlated with the likelihood of using and the
frequency of home health days but it is not significantly
correlated with the frequency of office-based physician
visits and hospital inpatient nights at the 5% level. The
frequency of dental visits is inversely correlated with dual
eligibility.
The significantly large effect of dual eligibility on the like-
lihood of using and the frequency of home healthcare
receipt days is remarkable over the whole sample and par-
ticularly among Asian sample with dual eligibility. The
large effect of dual eligibility on the home healthcare use
could be explained by the level and scope differences in
home health benefits between Medicare-only and Medi-
care-Medicaid dual eligibility programs. The traditional
Medicare-only program does not provide home health
benefits after 60-days. Medicaid, however, as a part of the
Notes: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regressions are performed. Incidence rate ratios and correlation coefficient estimates are presented 
for negative binomial (NB) and logit regressions, respectively. Corresponding exponential-scale and logit-scale standard errors reported in 
brackets. Categorized income variables are constructed by dividing family income by the applicable poverty line (based on family size and 
composition), with the resulting percentages grouped into 5 categories: negative or poor ("Income0", less than 100%), near poor ("Income1", 100% 
to less than 125%), low income ("Income2", 125% to less than 200%), middle income ("Income3", 200% to less than 400%), and high income 
("Income4", greater than or equal to 400%). Two-tailed t-tests and one-tailed chi-square tests are applied to the estimated coefficients and model 
specification statistics (i.e., LR and Vuong). Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3: Statistical association of dual eligibility and health care utilization (Continued)BMC Public Health 2006, 6:88 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/88
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dual eligibility program, takes almost full financial
responsibility for the use of home health care.
Two competing theories may be involved in interpreting
the dramatically increased utilization of home health care
by dual eligibles: (i) overutilization by duals under the
Medicare-Medicaid dual eligibility program in response to
the additional home health benefits from Medicaid and
(ii)  underutilization by non-duals under the Medicare-
only program because of its stringent home health bene-
fits.
With similar generosity of Medicare-only and dual eligi-
bility program for office-based physician services, the like-
lihood of using and the frequency of physician visits are
not correlated with dual eligibility at the 5% level. With-
out differences in the level of benefits for hospital care,
dual eligibility is not correlated with the frequency of hos-
pital inpatient nights though it is statistically significant to
increase the likelihood of using hospital care at the 5%
level. The additional dental benefit provided by Medicaid
is even inversely correlated with the frequency of dental
visits though it is not statistically significant to decrease
the likelihood of using dental services at the 5% level.
These results suggest that overutilization theory does not
seem to be persuasive. Dual eligibles do not always
increase utilization of services in response to expanded
benefits as shown in dental benefits newly covered by
Medicaid.
Increasing the likelihood of using home healthcare and
the high incidence rate ratio (IRR) of home health use by
duals relative to Medicare-only beneficiaries (Table 3)
may be the result of delayed realization of their unmet
needs under Medicare rather than the result of possible
overutilization due to dual eligibility. The unmet need for
home healthcare over the sample seems most urgent
among all health care types examined by the study.
With respect to racial differences, dually eligible Afro-
Americans use more office-based physician and dental
services than white duals. Asian duals use more home
health services than white duals at the 5% level. The dual
eligibility program seems particularly beneficial to Afro-
American duals. An epidemic like AIDS/HIV-positive,
which is most prevalent among young Afro-American
males, will not be treated under the traditional Medicare-
only program while they are fully covered by Medicaid
within the dual eligibility program [14,15].
It is also true that there may exist inverse causality running
from healthcare needs to dual eligibility: high levels of
healthcare needs and usage may lead to qualifying for
Medicare and Medicaid. Unravelling this complex rela-
tionship, further studies would need to control for poten-
tial confounding factors that may affect the relationship
between dual eligibility and healthcare utilization.
In addition, it would be interesting to conduct an analysis
separately for the disabled (e.g., Medicare beneficiaries
under 65) and the elderly (e.g., Medicare beneficiaries 65
or older). Inherent differences between the two sub-
groups may have affected or attenuated some of the rela-
tionships estimated by the study. To better understand the
utilization differentials between the dually eligible and
Medicare-only beneficiaries, further efforts may be
required for examining the disease/individual-specific uti-
lization patterns of the health care to consider potentially
inherent heterogeneity in the characteristics of the dually
eligible beneficiaries and their non-dual counterparts.
Conclusion
Dual eligibility has varied impact on health care utiliza-
tion across service types. More utilization of home health-
care among dual eligibles appears to be the result of
delayed realization of their unmet healthcare need under
the traditional Medicare-only program rather than the
result of overutilization in response to the expanded ben-
efits of the dual eligibility program. The dual eligibility
program is particularly beneficial to Asian and Afro-Amer-
ican duals in association with the provision of home
healthcare and dental services.
Notes
1. Another baseline count model would in any case have
a higher proportion of zeros than the parent Poisson dis-
tribution [8]. One source of excess zeros in count data is
overdispersion. Mullahy [16] emphasizes that the pres-
ence of excess zeros "is a strict implication of unobserved
heterogeneity." In other words, "the existence of unob-
servable heterogeneity may be sufficient to explain excess
zeros, without recourse to alternative specifications such
as zero inflated or hurdle models [17]."
2. Vuong [18] has proposed a test statistic for nonnested
models in comparison with their alternative distribution.
The logic of the testing procedure is to allow for overdis-
persion by specifying a negative binomial count data
process, then examine whether, even allowing for the over-
dispersion, there still appear to be excess zeros [8].
Vuong's statistic is bi-directional. If the absolute value of
the statistic is less than 2, then the test does not favour one
model or the other. Otherwise, large values for one model
(Model 1) whereas small (negative) values favour Model
2. Carrying out the test requires estimation of the two
models (Model 1 and Model 2) and computation of the
two sets of predicted probabilities.
3. The Poisson is the special case of the negative binomial
with  α  = 0. Note that if α  = 0 the negative binomialPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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reduces to the Poisson. The null hypothesis H0 :α = 0 can
be tested against the alternative α > 0 using the existing
hypothesis test methods [8]. Under the assumption that
relevant likelihood functions are specified, we have three
classical statistical techniques for testing overdispersion
hypotheses – the likelihood ratio (LR), Wald, and
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests [7,9,10]. A sound practice
of testing the overdispersion hypothesis is to estimate both
Poisson and negative binomial models. The likelihood
ratio (LR) test uses -2 times the difference in the fitted log-
likelihood of the two models [9]. Alternatively, a Wald
test can be performed, using the reported t statistic for the
estimated  overdispersion parameter α  in the negative
binomial model [7]. For all of the outcome variables, the
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics (reported in Table 3)
strongly reject the null hypothesis of the Poisson specifi-
cation, indicating the presence of overdispersion.
4. Out of the 8,262 sample individuals, 88 respondents
did not remember the amount of healthcare use. Specifi-
cally, we had 2, 7, 77, and 2 members without required
information about healthcare use in office-based physi-
cian visits, hospital inpatient nights, home health receipt
days, and dental visits. For computational precision, they
were not included in calculating the means and standard
errors.
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